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IN SEARCH OF A FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLEt 
Mark G. Yudo_r 
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY. By Frederick Schauer. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1982. Pp. xiv, 237. Cloth, 
$37.50; paper, $9.95. 
[I]he lesson of the past two hundred years is that we will do well to he on 
our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. 1 
Many scholarly works on freedom of expression are reminiscent 
of maps in the middle ages. They are more symbolic than real, more 
reflections of faith than observed facts. The style is "symbolic, orna-
mental, and often beautiful; the . . . content, impoverished and usu-
ally misleading; the purposes, a representation of the mind more 
than of the Earth."2 From this perspective, Frederick Schauer is the 
Mercator of modem first amendment theorists, eschewing blind faith 
and hackneyed metaphors and embracing analytical and empirical 
methods. In Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Schauer disen-
tangles and meticulously parses the traditional arguments for free 
speech, those based on the quest for truth, democracy, self-realiza-
tion, and individual dignity and autonomy. If he errs in ignoring the 
synergistic nature of those arguments, he succeeds in calling to our 
attention the relationship between freedom of expression and the 
general tenets of nineteenth-century liberalism. He challenges the 
faithful to distinguish between government regulation of speech and 
regulation of all manner of human conduct (pp. 71, 94).3 Professor 
Schauer relentlessly pursues a unitary principle of freedom of ex-
pression, aspiring to "an objective and universal standpoint."4 He 
attempts "to walk out of the cave, leave the city, climb the moun-
t I am grateful to David Anderson, Steven Goode, Sanford Levinson, William Powers, 
and Michael Sharlot for their criticisms and suggestions. 
• Associate Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas 
School of Law. B.A. 1965; LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania. Professor Yudof is the 
author of WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983) and a coauthor of EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND 
THE LAW (2d ed. 1983). - Ed. 
l. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977). 
2. J. WILFORD, THE MAPMAKERS 45 (1981); see also THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: 
SELECTED EsSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 60 (1981) ("Most of the literature of freedom is in es-
sence exhortatory and quite innocent of any intention toward analytical profundity."). 
3. See generally Bork, On Constitutional Economics, 1 REG., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 14; Coase, 
The Market far Goods and the Market far Ideas, 64 AMER. EcoN. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 384 
(1974). 
4. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE xiv (1983) (reviewed in this issue). 
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tain," and survey the philosophical terrain from a distance. But he is 
equally willing "to stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground."5 
I 
Schauer frees himself of much excess baggage by declining to 
discuss the specific meaning of the first amendment. He is not con-
cerned with the positivist constraints of the language, text, and his-
tory of that amendment, nor is he much inclined to rehash decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court. He wants to explore the princi-
ples that may undergird freedom of expression. He is interested in 
illuminating matters of political philosophy, in estimating the conse-
quences of differing approaches, in probing for inconsistencies and 
common threads. To be sure, he is concerned with defining 
"speech" and "liberty" (pp. 89-130), but his framework is more con-
ceptual than legal (pp. ix-x). His emphasis is on conceptual clarity, 
on reducing analytical confusion. Thus Schauer divides his book 
into three parts: "The Free Speech Principle," "Explication," and 
"Applications." Broadly speaking, his aim is to connect political phi-
losophy to law, with law being the dependent variable. 
Professor Schauer begins by distinguishing between "indepen-
dent principles" and those that are components of larger principles 
(p. 5). He suggests that we typically treat free speech as an in-
dependent principle, and that it must be so treated if it is to have 
"power and survivability" (p. 6): 
Our intuitions may be erroneous. They do suggest, however, that en-
quiring into the foundations of an independent principle of free speech 
would be fruitful. If such foundations exist, free speech will emerge as 
an independent principle. . . . But if there are no sturdy foundations, 
if there is no principle of free speech independent of a more general 
liberty, then free speech is more a platitude than a principle. [P. 6]. 
The distinction between independent and dependent principles al-
lows Schauer to urge that the question of free speech should be sepa-
rated from the question of the general authority of the state to limit 
individual liberty (p. 7). While liberty may be an aspect of free 
speech (p. 7), he suggests that an independent free speech principle 
should not necessarily bind its proponents to concepts of the mini-
mal state. 
The urge to identify an independent free speech principle, to sep-
arate the importance of expression from general principles of liberta-
rianism, lands Schauer in some considerable difficulties. As he 
grudgingly admits (p. 7), nearly all principles can be subsumed 
under broader principles.6 Democracy or equality might be compo-
5. Id. 
6. See Sokolow, Book Review (unpublished review of FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY) (1983) (on file with author). 
682 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 82:680 
nents of a broader principle of justice, liberty, or utility. 7 By requir-
ing independence, and by limiting arguments to those that would 
uniquely support a distinct principle, he may doom the case for free 
speech in advance. Free speech may not be an independent princi-
ple, and therefore a mere "platitude" in Schauer's lexicon, or it may 
be an independent principle with inconclusive justifications. 
Equally important, the search for "the" free speech principle 
leads Schauer, in large part, to discuss the justifications for freedom 
of expression in isolation from each other, ignoring their cumulative 
and synergistic effects. For example, one may not believe that free 
expression invariably advances the truth, strengthens individual au-
tonomy, or is a necessary condition for democracy. But the three 
arguments together might well support a free speech principle, 
whereas no single argument would be persuasive. And if one be-
lieves, for example, that democratic governments are more likely to 
protect individual autonomy, the overall impact of freedom of 
speech may be greater than the sum of the component justifications: 
the interaction of principles may create synergistic effects. 
Let me give an example of the difficulties with Schauer's ap-
proach. He suggests that the self-realization justification for freedom 
of speech "suffers from a failure to distinguish intellectual self-fulfil-
ment from other wants and needs, and thus fails to support a distinct 
principle of free speech" (p. 56). Even if it is true that communica-
tion may produce self-fulfillment, the same result can be produced 
by other experiences, e.g. , "world travel," "keen observation," or 
"changing employment every year" (p. 57). Ergo, self-fulfillment is 
a subprinciple of freedom, and "tells us nothing in particular about 
freedom of speech" (p. 58). Thus, "to the extent that a given society 
or government has for some reason elected to limit individual liberty 
in the broad sense, there remains no reason freedom of speech 
should not be subject to equivalent limitations" (p. 58). But suppose 
that speech, unlike a holiday in Rome, advances self-realization and 
contributes to the survival of democracy. Or that suppression of 
speech is more of an affront t_o an individual's dignity than regula-
tion of travel abroad. Or that government decisionmakers are more 
likely to be biased in speech than travel cases. A holistic argument, 
premised on a number of justificatic-;s, might well yield a principle 
that supports a strong presumption for free speech. 
Schauer's philosophical method produces other problems. The 
quest for an independent principle is quickly turned into a quest for 
a simple principle, an Occam's Razor. As Michael Sokolow has sug-
gested in an unpublished review of Free Speech, one might create 
and examine a single complex principle rather than many simple 
ones: 
7. See, e.g., Redish, The Value ef Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982), 
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If speech does not offend so as to provoke others to violence and is not 
a falsehood that will undermine the judicial system's search for truth, 
and is more likely than not to lead to democracy, truth, and individual 
fulfillment, and is not a known falsehood uttered to ruin the reputation 
of a third party, then government cannot prohibit the utterance of that 
speech.8 
At some point, so many nodules are added to a principle that it per-
haps may no longer qualify as a principle. A new "paradigm" may 
emerge that incorporates the old theory and its many quali:ficatiohs.9 
But the emphasis on independence appears to preclude, at least for 
this author, the formulation of a complex principle that embo4ies a 
variety of justifications. Schauer notes at one point that free speech 
may involve a collection of distinct but interrelated principles (p. 14), 
but he is content to treat relatively simple principles, one at a time, 
without attempting a holistic analysis. In this regard, he may be in-
voking an analytical technique more common to constitutional law-
yers than to philosophers. Io 
One way to create a simple and independent principle of free 
expression is to assume that speech is self-regarding, that is that it 
does not have an effect on others. If this were true, then regulation 
of speech might be impermissible whereas regulation of other-re-
garding conduct would be permissible. The analogy would be to as-
sertedly "victimless crimes." To Schauer's credit, he cogently 
demonstrates that speech is nearly always other-regarding: 
Speech is plainly not a self-regarding act, even assuming there be a 
category of acts that are self-regarding. Affecting others is most often 
the whole point of speaking. There are words, such as 'deceive', 'per-
suade', 'convince', and 'mislead', whose very logic presupposes that 
speech acts will affect others. [P. 10]. 
Speech may be protected despite its impact on others or, in some 
circumstances, precisely because it is thought to influence others. 
But speech is not protected as a part of the Millian private sphere of 
action.II 
The problem with Schauer's treatment of speech as other-regard-
ing is that this apt characterization does not resolve questions of 
magnitude or of causation. He rightly argues that speech may dam-
age a person's reputation, humiliate him, invade his privacy, or 
cause him to disobey the law (p. 10). And I have argued that govern-
ment expression, for example the condemnation of a public em-
ployee as a felon or communist, may hurt a person as much as 
8. Sokolow, supra note 6, at 7. 
9. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFlC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); K. 
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (rev. ed. 1979). 
10. See, for example, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
11. See generally Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 519 (1979). 
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physical incarceration or a taking of property. 12 But it does not fol-
low that no distinction may be drawn between other-regarding 
speech and other-regarding acts, or that "libertarian arguments do 
little to explain a Free Speech Principle that protects other-regarding 
conduct" (p. 11 ). The fact that speech is not "necessarily ineffectual" 
or may be capable "of causing unpleasant consequences" does not 
necessarily suggest that "we must look elsewhere" for justifications 
(p. 11 ). Rather we must estimate and compare the magnitude of the 
effects of speech as opposed to other forms of action. 
Suppose, for example, that advocating disobedience of the law 
were shown to have less of an impact on society than the actual acts 
of disobedience themselves. While the acts and the expression are 
both other-regarding, one might plausibly urge that the speech is less 
likely to cause harm than the illegal acts. 13 Such an argument would 
raise substantial problems as to what counts as evidence and who 
would make the necessary determinations. But, if we may suspend 
disbelief for a moment, assume that this is the case. From this prem-
ise, a polity might create a strong presumption in favor of free ex-
pression, one that could only be rebutted by a strong showing of the 
actuality or likelihood of harm. In the case of acts, however, there 
might be a strong contrary presumption: the acts themselves are 
overwhelmingly likely to cause the anticipated harms. The other-
regarding nature of speech may demonstrate that speech is not nec-
essarily harmless, but it does not demonstrate that expression and 
conduct need to be treated identically under libertarian principles. 
Apart from omitting consideration of the magnitude of harm, 
Schauer's analysis is problematic on the subject of causation. The 
fact that speech can have a particular effect does not mean that it 
will. Recall Justice Holmes's characterization of the facts in Abrams 
v. United States14 as "the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by 
an unknown man." When a speaker urges a crowd to assault a pub-
lic official, there are many questions that need to be asked about the 
actual or potential harm. Was the source of the message sufficiently 
legitimate and respected that the crowd would ( or did) respond to 
the speaker? Were there conflicting messages at roughly the same 
time? Was the crowd already intent on violence or did the speaker 
incite the crowd to acts that it would not otherwise commit? Was the 
crowd attentive? Did it hear the message? Did the crowd have the 
present capacity to commit the crime? Was there time to deliberate 
and consider the message? These questions raise extremely difficult 
issues of causation, and a legal system might well prefer per se rules 
12. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EX-
PRESSION IN AMERICA 263-80 (1983). 
13. See Redish, supra note 7, at 601. 
14. 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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to a case-by-case evaluation of all of these factors. Time and com-
plexity are the stuff of decisional paralysis, not judicial consecration 
of winners and losers. But the link between other-regarding speech 
and harm is not nearly as secure as Schauer appears to indicate. 
And if causation in relation to words is more difficult to ascertain 
than in relation to actions and if speech advances vital interests not 
advanced by conduct, the distinction might well support a principle 
that presumptively protects speech. 
Schauer's treatment of causation is all the more mystifying be-
cause, in other sections of Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, he 
is quite skeptical of causal relationships. For example, he argues 
that "without casual link between free speech and increased knowl-
edge the argument from truth must fail" (p. 19). To the question, 
"does knowledge triumph over ignorance" (p. 25), Schauer responds 
with the obvious answer. Sometimes untruths are quite attractive. 
"[T]he belief that truth will prevail when matched against false-
hood" cannot be demonstrated empirically, for people are not neces-
sarily as rational as the argument from truth assumes (p. 26). So 
too, while one's dignity may be affronted by restrictions on other-
regarding speech, it may also be affronted by the regulation of other-
regarding conduct (p. 64). But without a demonstration that the reg-
ulation of other-regarding speech causes more harm to one's dignity 
than the regulation of other-regarding conduct, defenders of free-
dom of expression are back in the old bind: they must defend a thor-
oughgoing libertarianism, a minimal state, if they are to defend free 
speech. 
Why is it that Schauer subjects the purported benefits of free ex-
pression to the most exacting causal analysis, but subjects the sup-
posed harms to only the most casual analysis? If there are 
counterexamples to the benefits of expression - situations where 
unregulated speech does not lead to truth, dignity, self-fulfillment, 
and democratic governance - are there not also counterexamples to 
the harms - situations where false speech does not harm reputations 
or where advocacy of illegal acts does not cause the commission of 
crimes? Schauer's approach would be more useful if he employed 
the same model of causation in assessing both benefits and harms. 
And even then, depending on the probabilities and the magnitude of 
effects, a polity might still decide to adopt a presumption in favor of 
all or particular types of expression. 
II 
Schauer's teleological framework for probing the rationales for 
freedom of speech indicates his dedication to consequentialist or 
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utilitarian approaches. Is His philosophical enquiry not only frees 
him of the constraints of positive law, it also allows him to consider 
broadly the consequences of various free speech principles. In a re-
vealing footnote, he states that he uses 
'utility' and 'utilitarian' in somewhat non-technical senses, to refer to 
practicality, or usefulness, or pragmatic considerations in general. I do 
not here equate utilitarian considerations with appeals solely to happi-
ness or pleasure. Perhaps "consequentialism" might be a better word 
. . ., but I want to stress the difference between . . . practical consider-
ations . . . and the more theoretical consequentialist arguments . . . . 
[P. 213, n.l]. 
But all of Schauer's consequentialism is of the theoretical rather than 
the practical variety; The book contains not a single reference to, 
much less discussion of, empirical studies of the questions he exam-
ines. This is so despite his mournful complaint that "the arguments 
cry out for empirical support," but regrettably "the [necessary] em-
pirical research to support or refute these arguments has not been 
undertaken in a systematic way" (p. 73). His empiricism is one of 
imagination and experience, not one of data bases and carefully con-
trolled social science surveys or experiments. 
I do not depreciate the role of experience, history, and intuition 
in assessing the consequences of free speech principles. Quite to the 
contrary, I have argued elsewhere that such analyses are appropri-
ate. I6 But Schauer appears to have a faith in empirical evidence that 
cannot be justified in the light of the existing state of social science 
research. I7 If he had perused the vast communications literature, he 
would have discovered that there is very little in the way of "hard 
empirical support" (p. 82) for virtually any proposition vital to the 
analysis of freedom of expression. Is This is particularly true of mass 
communications, given the pre-existing attitudes of audiences, the 
stubbornness of individuals, the opportunities to tune out messages, 
the characteristics of the speaker, and the multiplicity of variables 
that potentially influence people. I9 Terms that lawyers and philoso-
phers toss about with ease - like incitement, advocacy, captive 
audiences, and propaganda20 - do not find easy empirical counter-
15. See generally Lichtenberg, Book Review, 92 YALE L.J. 544 (1983) (discussing conse-
quentialist theory). 
16. See M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 89. See generally Yudof, School JJesegregalion: Legal 
Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS,, Autumn 1978, at 68-77. 
17. See M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 71-89; see also Yudof, supra note 16, at 68-77. 
18. Despite its notoriety, even studies of the effects of televised violence are inconclusive. 
See Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: Firs/ Amendment Principles and Social Science 
Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1134-70 (1978). 
19. See M. YUDOF, supra note 12, at 71-89; see also J. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS (1960). 
20. See generally Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 125-27 (1951). 
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parts in the communications literature. 
The null hypothesis is dominant in the communication litera-
ture.21 It is not so much that researchers believe that communica-
tions have no effects; rather, they find it extremely difficult to isolate 
those effects.22 The null hypothesis is presently confronted, alas, by 
a revitalized school of critical theory, a school that emphasizes that 
"[t]he communication channels and messages are as much a part of 
the structure of domination as are the military forces and the stric-
tures of the international banking system."23 Despairing of isolating 
causes and effects, these critical theorists abandon this frustrating 
subject and emphasize the "social role" of communications "in 
maintaining, enhancing, or disrupting . . . the existing interrelation-
ships of politics, economics, and culture."24 Rhetoric now substitutes 
for theory and empirical research. 25 
But the news for Professor Schauer may be even worse. Not only 
is the ship of empiricism still at sea; he may be waiting in the wrong 
port. 26 Many of the questions he asks about self-expression, dignity, 
and truth may never be subject to even crude measurement, as they 
embody long-range empirical and normative judgments. What 
counts as progress toward higher levels of knowledge and dignity, 
for example, may be more a function of normative political and 
moral judgments than of any empirical calculus. And even if mea-
surements were possible, a decision as to how much harm to tolerate 
from free speech in return for an ascertainable quantum of benefit 
may itself be a normative judgment. Schauer has not quite made 
good on his assertion in the preface that "conceptual analysis is more 
prominent in this book than normative argument" (p. ix). He im-
plies as much in his "Explication" section, in an analogy to the crim-
inal justice system that is many pages and concepts removed from 
his articulation of first principles ( chapter 9). 
21. See Schramm, Nature of Communication Between Humans, in THE PROCESS AND EF-
FECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 7 (W. Schramm & D. Roberts eds. 1971). 
22. As I said on another occasion: 
The communications literature . . • suggests that messages are more likely to be persua-
sive if they reinforce existing attitudes, or if they build incrementally on those attitudes. If 
the messages are addressed to a mass audience, common sense suggests that an appeal to 
widely-shared cultural, social, and political values is the key to success. Virtually by defi-
nition, such consensual values are likely to be embraced by a large number of mass com-
municators. If this is the case, the efficacy of the entire system of communications may be 
quite high even though empiricists cannot connect particular communicators or messages 
with specific effects. 
M. YUDOF, supra note 12, at 84-85. 
23. Schiller, Critical Research in the Information Age, 33 J. OF COMMUNICATION, Summer 
1983, at 249, 250. 
24. Slack & Allor, The Political and Epistemological Constituents of Critical Communication 
Research, 33 J. OF COMMUNICATION, Summer 1983, at 208, 214. 
25. See generally Levinson, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466, 1484-86 (1983). 
26. See generally C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979). 
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Schauer paraphrases Blackstone's maxim "that it is better that 
ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man be punished" (p. 
136). This assumes, of course, that mistakes in the administration of 
laws are inevitable. But Blackstone's balancing of the harms and 
benefits of the criminal process affirms "the belief that the erroneous 
deprivation of individual liberty is far more serious than the errone-
ous release of one who is in fact guilty" (p. 137). This belief, how-
ever, is rooted in a value judgment and not in empirical analysis. 
The empirical data, optimally, may inform decisionmakers about the 
costs of a system - the number of guilty persons set free, the 
number of innocent persons who are punished - and costs may in-
fluence decisions about the nature of the system. Commitment to a 
norm may be strained or reinforced as costs are identified and mea-
sured. But empirical evidence alone cannot settle the question of the 
rightness of the norm. 21 
Consequences are irrelevant only to the mentally infirm and to 
neo-Kantians and others who have glimpsed the New Jerusalem.28 
As R.M. Hare has said, "a complete moral system will depend both 
on logical and on empirical theses - which makes it all the more 
important to be clear which are which."29 This is true of principles of 
free speech. If the issue is whether to tolerate injuries to reputation 
in order to protect speech that is thought to advance democratic val-
ues, facts alone will not settle the matter. Empirical studies cannot 
tell us how much benefit from free expression is enough, or how 
much harm is too much. At best, they can tell us only the price of 
our moral and political commitments. The key is to distinguish 
moral thinking from "facts about the way things and people are, in 
the world as it is."30 
One final point on this matter. Moral principles that are only 
presumptive in character may yield political principles that are abso-
lute. Moral arguments over whether free speech yields increased 
knowledge or strengthens democracy may be close, and the conse-
quences may vary depending on the context and circumstances. But 
if political principles, in a sense, are applied moral principles, and if 
political principles are fashioned and applied by imperfect human 
beings and institutions, it may be preferable to have per se rules that 
circumscribe the range of discretionary judgments. Professor 
Schauer recognizes the imperfections of decisionmaking in the real 
world, but declines to contemplate the possiblity of absolute rules. 
27. See Yudof, supra note 16, at 73-75. 
28. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971) ("All ethical doctrines worth our atten-
tion take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be 
irrational, crazy."). 
29. R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 5 (1981) (reviewed in this issue). See generally Green-
awalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977). 
30. R.M. HARE, supra note 29, at 5. 
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He notes that "in applying the law of defamation, it is necessary to 
recognize that judicial determination of truth or falsity may occa-
sionally be in error'' (p. 170): 
Because of these uncertainties and risks in the process of ascertaining 
truth, a rule penalizing falsity has the actual effect of introducing some 
self-censorship as to statements that are in fact true. [P. 171, emphasis 
in original]. 
But instead of discussing the pros and cons of absolute rules, he ar-
gues that "[t]he problem is inevitably one of balancing interests": 
Given the value of the circulation of accurate information, and given 
the harm of defamatory falsehood, no solution at either extreme seems 
tenable. [P. 171]. 
An extreme solution, however, may be tenable, not as a matter of 
moral principle, but as a recognition of the fragility of human insti-
tutions applying such a principle. This is a variant of the argument 
from uncertainty, the uncertainty over whether institutions will re-
flect our principles in their decisions. For example, depending on its 
preferences for protecting reputations or enhancing self-governance, 
a polity might choose to treat defamation of public officials precisely 
like any other case of defamation, or it might create a rule that pub-
lic officials may never recover damages for defamatory statements 
relating to their fitness for public service or the discharge of their 
duties. Moral ambiguity need not necessarily be translated into polit-
ical ambiguity. 
III 
Professor Schauer's discussion of the competing candidates for a 
free speech principle (pp. 15-86) is provocative and interesting. In 
analyzing the argument from truth, the theory that "truth will most 
likely surface when all opinions may freely be expressed" (p. 16), he 
notes the circularity of many forms of the argument. If truth is not 
independently defined, and if it refers only to those propositions that 
are widely accepted (the "consensus" or "survival" theory of 
truth),31 then the truth theory reduces itself to a preference for "a 
process of open discussion" over other methods of decisionmaking 
- (p. 20). But in the absence of "independent criteria for truth,"32 the 
31. See generally Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND. 
L.J. l (1971). 
32. See, e.g., Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
157, 160 (1980). Professor Chevigny, while rejecting the justification from truth for free 
speech, makes the interesting argument that free speech is necessary to give propositions 
meaning, and the 
loss of meaning is objectionable for any person or government that purports to act purpos-
ively .... If the lesson drawn from the philosophy oflanguage is correct, that the mean-
ing of statements within a system depends on formulating other aspects of the system 
through dialogue, then every theory must allow for dialogue concerning its supporting 
propositions. In other words, once a theory asserts that it means something, dialogue is 
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theory does not tell us why we should prefer open discussion "to any 
other process, such as random selection or authoritarian fiat" (p. 20). 
If majority rule and open discussion are favored processes, then the 
real preference is for democratic norms over other forms of govern-
ance, not objective truth over falsity. (pp. 34, 39). 
Schauer also effectively argues that "the argument from truth 
may easily be characterized as an argument from uncertainty" (p. 
31). Uncertainty is epistemologically important because "the valid-
ity of the argument varies in direct proportion to the degree of uncer-
tainty inherent in the category of proposition involved" (p. 30). The 
more uncertain the truth, the more value there may be to open dis-
cussion. The argument from truth may be primarily rooted in a con-
cern for aesthetic, ethical, political, and religious expression, 
categories of speech that are not likely to command a ready consen-
sus (p. 31 ). We may be more certain of truths in mathematics or 
science, and hence be less certain an airing of contrary views will 
lead to the discovery of new truths and knowledge. Stated differ-
ently, there may be more concern over the impact of speech regula-
tions in some contexts than in others. 
As Schauer recognizes, even the most established of scientific 
theories is subject to revision in the light of new evidence. There are 
only degrees of certainty and consistency, even in mathematics.33 
But I was struck by the value of Schauer's insights in relation to 
current disputes over indoctrination in public schools.34 It appears 
to be one thing for school authorities to embrace established scien-
tific truths, to the exclusion of less accepted scientific theories, 35 and 
quite another for them to espouse political truths to the exclusion of 
alternative visions of politics. 36 The former is likely to be treated as 
necessary to establish that meaning. It follows that any political theory that denies a right 
of free discourse is internally contradictory since it condemns itself to a loss of meaning. 
Id at 162. Compare id with Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid JJown: A Critique of InlerpreliV• 
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 785 (1983) ("[T]he only coherent basis for 
the requisite continuities of history and meaning is found in the communitarian assumptions 
of conseivative social thought .... "); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373, 
377 (1982) ("[M]uch contemporary writing ... is explicitly self-referential in its demand that 
the reader . . . confront the extent to which language and image are unavoidably ambiguous, 
and its assertion that any given ... meaning is the product of an interchange between object 
and viewer rather than an attribute of the object itself."). 
33. See the discussion of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem in D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, 
EscHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 24 (1979) ("[N]o axiomatic system whatsoever 
could produce all number-theoretical truths, unless it were an inconsistent system."). 
34. See generally S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOL• 
ING (1983) (reviewed in this issue); Yudof, The Stale as Editor or Censor: Book Selection and 
the Public Schools, in OFFICE FOR INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, AM. LIBRARY ASSN., CENSOR• 
SHIP LITIGATION AND THE SCHOOLS 49 (1983); Harpaz,A Paradigm of Firs/ Amendment Dilem-
mas: Resolving Public School Library Censorship Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG, L. REV, I (1981). 
35. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). See gener-
ally CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE (M. La Follette ed. 1983). 
36. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
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involving the selectivity inherent in any educational process, while 
the latter is likely to be treated as a "pale of orthodoxy" or ideologi-
cal censorship.37 The distinction also parallels the differentiation of 
skill training and the inculcation of attitudes or moral values. 38 But 
before taking the uncertainty principle too seriously, perhaps one 
should recall Bertrand Russell's admonition about the truths of 
science: 
Consider what we do to our children. We do not say to them: "Some 
people think the earth is round, and others think it flat; when you grow 
up, you can, if you like, examine the evidence and form your own con-
clusion." Instead of this we say: "The earth is round." By the time 
our children are old enough to examine the evidence, our propaganda 
has closed their minds, and the most persuasive arguments of the Flat 
Earth Society make no impression.39 
The chapters on the arguments from self-expression, self-realiza-
tion, and dignity4° make vitally important points about the relation-
ship of freedom of expression to a thoroughgoing nineteenth-century 
liberalism. As Schauer notes, happiness and self-realization of the 
individual may be important values, but what basis is there for dis-
tinguishing among types of freedoms that advance those values? 
Many people indeed believe that freedom to express their opinions is a 
primary component of their happiness. But others are as likely to be 
satisfied with other freedoms, or prefer the security or intellectual an-
aesthesia that accompanies rigid controls on expression. [P. 49]. 
Our physical well-being, our non-intellectual pleasures, our need for 
food and shelter, and our desire for security are also important, al-
though these are wants that we share with the rest of the animal world. 
Because any governmental or private action to restrict communication 
is usually justified in the name of one of these or other similar wants 
. . ., a particular protection of communication under this version of a 
natural rights theory must assume that communication is prima facie 
more important than these other interests. [P. 55]. 
Either we must admit that there is nothing special about self-fulfill-
ment through expression, that free-speech stands on the same plane 
as other wants and needs (p. 56), or we must construct a normative 
theory based "not so much on what man is as on what man ought to 
be" (p. 49). If the self-fulfillment argument is to distinguish the sat-
37. See Pico, 451 U.S. at 853. See generally Stem, Challenging Ideological Exclusion ef 
Curriculum Material· Rights ef Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 485 (1979). 
38. See Katz, 17ze Present Moment in Educational Reform, 41 HARV. Eouc. REv. 342, 355 
(1971). 
39. B. RUSSELL, POWER 268-69 (1938). 
40. See generally Baker, Scope ef the First Amendment Freedom ef Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964 (1978); Redish, supra note 7. Even the proponents of self-realization theories do not 
agree on their meaning and application. See Baker, Realizing Se!f-Realization: Corporate 
Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982); 
Redish, Se!f-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom ef Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Redish, Reply]. 
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isfaction and happiness of purchasing a home from that of writing a 
book, it must call upon a normative vision of liberty or an empirical 
distinction between the self-realization effects of speech and 
conduct.41 
The power of Professor Schauer's analysis of self-realization may 
be demonstrated by consideration of Professor C. Edwin Baker's ap-
proach to the constitutionality of government regulation of commer-
cial speech.42 For Baker, "a complete denial of first amendment 
protection for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is 
required by, first amendment theory."43 Why is this? Because pro-
tected speech exists "as a manifestation of the self, and the selfs 
choices and commitments . . . . As long as speech represents the 
freely-chosen expression of the speaker while depending for its 
power on the free acceptance of the listener, freedom of speech rep-
resents a charter of liberty for noncoercive action . . . ."44 But is 
not speech in the marketplace a "freely-chosen expression of the 
speaker?" A reflection of self?45 For Baker, the question raises con-
cerns about false consciousness. In his view, the market creates the 
demands that it satisfies, and besides, "[h]ow 'profit' wants the world 
to be bears no necessary relation to how any individual wants it to 
be. To allow 'profit' to vote is to depreciate human freedom."46 In 
short, commercial speech does not advance the self-realization objec-
tive of freedom of expression. 
But how does Professor Baker know these things? Do not 
Madison A venue artists and writers derive- satisfaction from creating 
and distributing Coca-Cola advertisements? What of the vacuum 
cleaner salesperson who has the opportunity to deliver his entire talk 
on the glories of his product? Might not the choice of jobs reflect the 
satisfaction of speaking on the job as well as wages or profits? An 
anthropomorphic conception of "profit" will not do either. If the 
norms of profit maximization in corporations constrain the individ-
ual's range of choices over expression, this is also true of the articles 
41. See, e.g., Redish, Reply, supra note 40, at 684. See generally A. MACINTYRE, AFTER 
VIRTUE (1981). Professor Redish also espouses a positivist justification for limiting the self-
realization rationale to freedom of speech. Redish, Reply, supra, at 684. 
42. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. Rev. 1 
(1976). 
43. Id. at 3. 
44. Id. at 7 (emphasis deleted). 
45. See Redish,Reply,supra note 40, at 686 ("Equally damaging to Baker's [theory] •.. is 
... the impossibility of separating the profit orientation from the goal of self-realization,") 
(footnote omitted). 
46. Baker, supra note 42, at 15-16. This view of the profit motive and self-realization leads 
to the supposition that corporations do not have free speech rights. See Baker, supra note 40, 
at 652, 677; Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE 253 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this issue). See generally Powe, Mass Speech 
and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. Rev. 243, 254-60; Levinson, supra note 25, at 
1478-80. 
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of a newspaper reporter working for The Washington Post.47 It is 
certainly true of lawyers soliciting clients,48 or textbook writers and 
publishers seeking to nail down sales in the Texas and California 
public school markets.49 
And from the perspective of the listener, 50 how does one know 
that the capitalists have created wants and needs that would not 
otherwise exist? Do Polish and Chinese people, in the absence of 
mass advertising, decline to press for consumer goods like television 
sets and automobiles? Do not producers often satisfy real wants and 
needs, though they seek to induce consumers to buy their products 
and not the products of others? Is there not a mutually affecting rela-
tionship between consumer needs and producer advertising? The 
fact that mass advertising and hedonistic consumers coexist in a cul-
ture does not necessarily imply that the former caused the latter. In 
yielding to a simplistic etiology, Baker ignores a primal truth about 
cultures: they are culturally biased. 
The concept of false consciousness51 is pivotal to Professor 
Baker's self-realization principle for free speech, allowing him to re-
ject arguments for protecting commercial speech. But how do we 
identify true and false expressions of preferences? Who is in charge 
of deciding such questions?52 If a person has been indoctrinated to 
enjoy chocolate ice cream, and Professor Baker believes that right-
thinking persons would prefer vanilla ice cream, does it follow that 
the deviant gourmand does not experience happiness upon eating 
chocolate? Would revelation and rumination cause the person to 
embrace vanilla?53 Should we assume that the preference for choco-
late was coerced by family, peers, mass media, state, and Baskin 
Robbins?54 
41. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 1479. 
48. For cases involving solicitation, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 
(1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
49. See generally F. FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED (1979). 
50. This perspective is rejected by Professor Baker. See Redish, Reply, supra note 40, at 
686. 
51. See generally R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1981). 
52. As Professor Redish has stated: 
Baker's fallacy on this point is his assumption that the value of self-rule is limited to 
whatever he would label "rational, intelligent self-rule." But such a limitation would to-
tally undermine the concept, for to allow individuals to choose only what some external 
force determines is "rational" and "intelligent" is effectively to deprive them of self-rule. 
Redish, Reply, supra note 40, at 685 (citing Redish, supra note 7, at 618-19). 
53. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 525-26 (popcorn). 
54. One approach to the dilemma of false and true wants and needs is identified by Ray-
mond Geuss as arising from the writings of critical theorists: 
[W]e may call a belief "reflectively unacceptable" to a group of agents if they would give 
it up, were they to reflect on it in the light of information about the conditions under 
which they could have acquired it .... Legitimizing beliefs are acceptable only if they 
could have been acquired by the agents in a free and uncoerced discussion in which all 
members of the society take part. 
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Further, as critical theorists55 and others56 have noted, false con-
sciousness is also a problem in politics. Governments engage in 
massive communications activities, including public schooling, pub-
lication of pamphlets and books, maintenance of libraries, and ad-
vertising, and these efforts raise significant issues of indoctrination to 
government-embraced values.57 Such indoctrination, potentially, 
may constrain the political speech of individuals. If an orientation 
towards profits reflects a false consciousness, so too might expres-
sions in favor of voting rights and racial equality. 
As Schauer suggests, the logic of the argument from self-realiza-
tion, in the absence of normative theory of rights, will not yield an 
intelligible distinction between freedom of speech and a general the-
ory of libertarianism. In the guise of distinguishing true wants from 
false ones, Baker has drawn an unjustifiable distinction between 
commercial and other forms of speech. To the extent that Professor 
Baker is displeased with capitalist men and women, he should be 
fashioning and defending a normative theory of the good life and a 
vision of the men and women who would inhabit that world.58 Free 
speech may be essential to that epistemological process. Alterna-
tively, he might espouse a broader theory of liberty, one that covers 
both political and commercial speech. 59 
Schauer is equally adept in his treatment of the argument from 
dignity, the notion that "when the state suppresses ... [a] person's 
expression of . . . ideas, the state is insulting that person and af-
fronting his dignity" (p. 62). The core difficulty, once again, is that 
dignity supports a global argument for liberty, "not an argument for 
a special liberty of speech" (p. 65): 
R. GEuss, supra note 51, at 62 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also B. ACKER· 
MAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139-67, 180-86, 352-55 (1980). One should not 
lightly assume, however, that all beliefs contrary to those of a critical theorist have been ac-
quired through coercion, nor that that awareness of the coercion would necessarily cause a 
person to change his or her beliefs. Further, the identification of what is coercion may itself be 
influenced by "ideology," as is clearly indicated by the writings of the critical theorists. And in 
a specific cultural context, the projection of true beliefs may be far more speculative and nor-
mative than empirical. 
With all these difficulties, the reader may wonder why critical theorists remain so infatu-
ated with the hermeneutic concept of "false consciousness." The answer lies in the disap-
pointed expectations of would-be revolutionaries. See I. BALDUS, MARXISM AND 
DOMINATION 55-56 (1982) (concept of false consciousness arises out of the Marxist's need to 
explain the anomaly that "the consciousness and practice of the Western industrial working 
class has been directed toward the amelioration of its level of consumption rather than the 
transformation of its mode of production."). 
55. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 
205 (1979). See generally R. GEuss, supra note 5 l. 
56. See, e.g., M. YUDOF, supra note 12; Shiffrin, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1745 
(1982). 
57. See generally M. YuooF, supra note 12. 
58. See generally A. MAclNTYRE, supra note 41. 
59. See Coase, supra note 3, at 389. 
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[W]hen words are other-regarding, whatever the precise definition of 
that term, the ideas of dignity and insult are no more dispositive than 
they would be if someone claimed his dignity to be insulted by restric-
tions on his freedom to pollute the atmosphere, commit assault, play 
the saxophone in church, or practice cardio-vascular surgery without a 
medical degree or licence. [P. 64]. 
My impression is that people gain dignity from adequate incomes, 
interesting jobs, meals on the table, shelter, and economically in-
dependent children. If dignity is the linchpin, and if the argument is 
that dignity in the sphere of ideas is somehow different from that in 
the economic sphere, the proponent of the distinction "has no arrows 
left in his quiver if and when his arguments for this broad Millian 
freedom are rejected" (p. 65).60 If the argument is that personal dig-
nity requires equal respect for individuals in political processes, in 
the public sphere, then the dignity argument merges with the norma-
tive argument from democracy. 
Schauer's treatment of the justification from personal autonomy 
is similar to that for self-fulfillment and dignity (pp. 67-72).61 In the 
absence of a demonstration that repression of speech is more harm-
ful to personal autonomy than regulation of conduct, devotees of 
freedom of expression should join the ranks of laissez-faire capital.;. 
ists. If governmental paternalism is accepted in the sphere of con-
duct, for example compulsory education and consumer protection 
laws, then the same types of justifications (avoidance of harms, af-
firmative liberty, transactional incapacities) ought to apply to pater-
nalism in the realm of expression. Principles of free expression that 
focus on the interests of the listeners frequently are rooted in tradi-
tional libertarian ideas, and are difficult to disentangle from general 
theories of liberty generating visions of the minimally intrusive state. 
Indeed, the leading proponent of the autonomy theory, Professor 
Scanlon, recanted largely on this ground. 62 If autonomy is defined 
in terms of the political process, then it draws its normative force 
from its instrumental relationship to democratic values and not pri-
marily from its intrinsic value to individuals. 
60. Of course, one might argue that self-realization from economic gain is inherently lim-
ited by virtue of scarce resources, whereas free speech is not so limited by scarcity. But presum-
ably those who own television and radio stations and newspapers may deploy their resources 
for expression and thereby reach higher levels of self-realization than those who must rely 
upon face-to-face communication. Thus, the self-realization argument might well support ac-
cess to newspapers and cable television channels, campaign financing laws, and other efforts to 
secure equality among speakers. See generally Barron, Access to the Press - A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the 
Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975). 
61. See generally Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, l PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 204 
(1972). 
62. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 532. 
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IV 
The most perplexing aspect of the book is Professor Schauer's 
reliance on an analytical method in the chapters on theory and his 
tacit rejection of that method in the chapters on applications. 
Schauer treats the various theoretical justifications for free speech 
largely in isolation from each other, and he rejects principles if they 
are not self-sufficient. This approach is rhetorically effective, as when 
he keenly demonstrates, for example, that self-realization or the ad-
vancement of truth, standing alone, will not support a free speech 
principle. Conceptual flaws are largely demonstrated through 
counterexamples. In this fashion, the theoretical chapters are re-
sponsive to the rhetorical excesses of the philosophers of free speech 
who seek a general theory that draws on a single and coherent per-
spective - the one right theory that excludes all other justifications 
from its domain. Recall John Milton's unbridled reconstruction of 
human experience: "Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"63 
But Professor Schauer's rhetorical style, while responsive to the 
perfectionism of other theorists, makes it appear that he too is a 
perfectionist, that if his fertile mind can conjure up one counterex-
ample, a theory has been devastated. Yet, in the last part of the 
book, the author is far more practical and realistic, eschewing perfect 
conceptual arguments for the inevitable adjustment of conflicting 
principles in the flawed world in which we live. Thus, it is as if there 
are two Frederick Schauers. One is "eclectic"64 about free speech 
theories and recognizes the limits of philosophical arguments. The 
other appears to be a perfectionist, adopting a reactive analytical 
style that belies that eclecticism. The two perspectives simply coexist 
in Free Speech and are never explicitly linked to each other. 
The tendency to rebut through counterexamples, the pink snake 
style of argument, is disturbing. If X is a justification for Y, a free 
speech principle, and if X is not always true, then it follows that Y is 
not defensible. If a theorist imaginatively identifies a single counter-
example, no matter how unlikely, the theory is discarded. One pink 
snake and the terrain is uninhabitable. In his chapters on principles, 
Professor Schauer sometimes succumbs to this "it ain't necessarily 
so" refrain. Let me give an example. To the proposition that free 
speech advances the search for truth, he responds that "it is simply a 
mistake to say that the expression of false or unsound opinions can 
never have unpleasant consequences" (p. 28). With respect to race 
relations, "[h]istory has shown us that people unfortunately are 
much more inclined to be persuaded of the rectitude of oppressing 
63. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (Cambridge ed. 1918) (1st ed. 1644). 
64. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 21 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980). See generally Shiffrin, 
Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983). 
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certain races . . than they are likely to accept other unsound and 
no less palpably wrong views" (p. 28). So much for the truth. But 
who asserts that "unsound opinions can never have unpleasant con-
sequences?" If unsound opinions on race relations are harmful, does 
it follow that the argument from truth has no weight? Are we not 
worried about our uncertainty over what is true? Where are the so-
nar instruments that detect unsound views? How about the notion 
that, on balance, truth is advanced by free speech? 
Another example comes from the author's discussion of the argu-
ment from democracy. The argument, as Schauer frames it, is that 
the citizenry should have access to information and opinions in or-
der to exercise its political judgment and to exercise control over 
those who govern them (pp. 38-39). This perspective is taken from 
Meiklejohn's theory of freedom of expression and self-governing 
speech,65 though Schauer, unlike Meiklejohn, perceives that both 
speakers and listeners require protection under the democratic the-
ory. It is also similar to Blasi's notion of free speech as a check on 
government abuse of power66 and my own notion of the "self-con-
trolled" citizen.67 Schauer has many interesting things to say about 
this rationale,68 but he considers the "paradox of power" (p. 40) to 
be dispositive: 
If the people collectively are in fact the sovereign, and if that sovereign 
has the unlimited powers normally associated with sovereignty, _then 
acceptance of this view of democracy compels acceptance of the power 
of the sovereign to restrict the liberty of speech just as that sovereign 
may restrict any other liberty . 
. . . [A] Free Speech Principle exists only ifit is an exception to the 
general rule of majority sovereignty; only if it is a right, of indetermi-
nate strength, against the majority. Any distinct restraint on majority 
power, such as a principle of freedom of speech, is by its nature anti-
democratic, anti-majoritarian. [P. 40]. 
Thus, an argument for freedom of expression based on democratic 
premises is a contradiction. 
As Schauer admits, his "argument may prove too much"; much 
lurks in the "sterile notion of democracy as majority rule" (p. 41). 
But because a democracy might choose not to remain a democracy, 
and foreclose the process by which majorities are formed and ex-
pressed, he rejects the strong argument from democracy. This par-
ticular pink snake comes of the intoxications of philosophy. If 
65. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). 
66. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH 
J. 521; see also Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983). 
61. See M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 20-37. 
68. But see Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE LJ. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart 
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). 
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slavery is forbidden, may a man voluntarily sell himself into slavery? 
If human life is protected, may a person commit suicide? But a 
snake charmer can respond to the paradox of the suicidal urges of 
democracy: the polity should hobble along with the free speech and 
democracy until the Armageddon. Perhaps the majority can decide 
to stamp out free speech and majoritarian politics, thereby insuring a 
totalitarian future. That a democratic government will not necessar-
ily protect freedom of expression does not mean that such freedom is 
not a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for democracy. 
Or perhaps democratic values include root notions of 
countermajoritarian rights?69 Or perhaps temporal majorities need 
to be distinguished from constitutional majorities over time, thereby 
legitimating a principle of paternalism to preserve democracy.70 But 
however these hypothetical traumas are to be met, why is the argu-
ment from democracy for freedom of expression defeated because 
scholars can imagine situations in which our principles will turn 
back on themselves? Is it not sufficient if the principle works tolera-
bly well in the here and now? 
Needless to say, the "falsification" turf is normally reserved for 
philosophers, and I tread on it with some trepidation. Robert Paul 
Wolff, for example, has contrasted the philosophical method of "for-
mal logic, where a theorem is invalidated by a single counterexam-
ple, no matter how bizarre or peripheral," with an "opposed 
conception of philosophy" that tests the power of the central insight 
of a philosophical position.71 Wolff prefers the latter method, 
though he does not reject the former. I agree. In the realm of ap-
plied moral principles, which I have described as political principles 
to be applied by imperfect human beings and institutions, the 
method of "formal logic" has its place; it reaffirms our commitment 
to reason and our capacity for reflection. But formal logic is not all-
encompassing. History ·and human experience also provide gui-
dance. If free speech meaningfully contributes to democracy, the 
quest for truth, and human dignity, the existence of a few difficult 
and atypical counterexamples, imaginatively conjured up, should 
not be dispositive. Logic needs to be balanced against life, as imper-
fect people aim for principles that work tolerably well in an imper-
fect world. Virtually no practical principle of politics is immune to 
the virus of the counterexample. At some point, the counterexam-
ples may be so numerous and compelling as to cause the abandon-
ment of the principle. They may even be confirmed by evolving 
69. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
70. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26-28 (1962); J. BUCHANAN, 
THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY 42-43, 93-98 (1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 
(1978). 
71. R.P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 7 (1977). 
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experience. But logical possibilities should be only a part of an over-
all calculus as to whether the normative and empirical game is worth 
the candle. 
Ironically, I have good reason to believe that Professor Schauer is 
largely in agreement with me on the falsification debate. In an up-
coming article, he examines and rejects "the argument from weird 
cases" in responding to the hyperbole of the "deconstructionist" 
movement in constitutional law. He rightly suggests that it is a "non 
sequitur . .. [to] move from the proposition that language is imper-
fect to the proposition that language is useless."72 So, too, of princi-
ples of free speech. Any principle or language employed to describe 
legal norms will inevitably be unclear in some circumstances. But 
there are core and fringe applications of rules and principles, and it 
certainly does not follow that a difficult case or a wrong result at the 
fringes necessarily means that the principle should be rejected. To 
paraphrase Professor Schauer's remarks about language, if princi-
ples are neyer perfect but "cannot plausibly be claimed to be always 
worthless, the argument from weird cases turns out to say al.most 
nothing at all. "73 If these views fail to emerge clearly from Free 
Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, it is only because of the author's 
compulsion to respond in kind to the rhetorical styles of free speech 
theorists. When he turns to the application of free speech principles, 
he is more modest about the possibilities of principled decisionmak-
ing by human institutions. 
V 
The argument for freedom of expression that Schauer finds most 
attractive appears in a chapter on "the utility of suppression" (p. 73). 
He characterizes the other arguments for a free speech principle as 
positive justifications, depending on the asserted benefits of UJlfegu-
lated speech (p. 81 ). He proposes instead a negative theory of 
expression: 
Even if there is nothing especially good about speech compared to 
other conduct, the state may have less ability to regulate speech than it 
has to regulate other forms of conduct, or the attempt to regulate 
speech may entail special harms or special dangers not present in regu-
lation of other conduct. 
. . . Experience arguably shows that governments are particularly 
bad at censorship, that they are less capable of regulating speech than 
they are of regulating other forms of conduct. [P. 81]. 
In probing the "deeper reason" for his intuition that government 
cannot be trusted to regulate speech, Schauer perceives that regula-
tory authority is given to government officials who "have the most to 
72. Schauer, Easy Cases (unpublished manuscript). 
13. Id. 
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lose from arguments against their authority" (p. 81 ). They may 
abuse their authority over speech - for example, with respect to 
treason and sedition - precisely because they have interests that di-
verge from the public interest in protecting the polity from harm: 
Reasons of power, prestige, mission, or money inspire in people the 
desire to attain government office, and those same reasons also inspire 
in them the want to retain those positions . 
. . . [A]ny system of regulating political speech puts in control 
those with the most to lose from the activities they are regulating. [Pp. 
81-82]. 
He concludes with the maxim that no person ought "to be judge of 
his own cause" (p. 82). 
The negative justification, or government incompetence argu-
ment, for free speech raises numerous difficulties. First, Schauer has 
once again been inconsistent with regard to the need for empirical 
proof and causal relationships to support a principle. For his own 
vision of a free speech principle, he is in no mood to rearrange the 
deck chairs on the Titanic. He admits that "[i]t is true that there is 
no hard empirical support for the proposition that government offi-
cials are likely to be over-aggressive censors for reasons of self-inter-
est" (p. 82). Yet he presses on. He argues that the "nature of the 
relationship," and, I would add, history and experience, 'justifies the 
assumption of bias" (p. 82). Further, he limits the incompetence ar-
gument in ways that are not intuitively (or empirically) obvious. For 
example, consider the potential of government to employ its commu-
nications powers to engineer the consent of the citizenry; govern-
ment officials have a built-in incentive to indoctrinate citizens to 
norms that serve the interests of those in power.74 But here (p. 56) 
and elsewhere75 Professor Schauer overlooks or rejects this logical 
extension of the incompetence principle. 
Second, he urges that the "slippery-slope" is more treacherous 
for the regulation of speech than for the regulation of conduct (pp. 
83-85). But it is far from clear that the administration of laws gov-
erning speech inherently requires a more refined micrurgy than laws 
regulating action. The inability to convey precise meanings is inher-
ent in law and language;76 the vagaries of "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" do not appear to be of lower order than those for 
incitement, advocacy, or pornography. Nor are the rules for conduct 
necessarily more easily learnable by administrators than those for 
speech regulations. Rules regulating conduct frequently call for dif-
14. See M. YunoF, supra note 12. 
75. Schauer, Book Review, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 379-83 (1983) (reviewing M. YUDOF, 
supra note 12). 
16. See Levinson, supra note 32. 
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fl.cult assessments of motivation,77 as for example in racial discrimi-
nation and unfair labor practice suits. I suspect that the alleged 
vagueness of rules governing speech, and judicial sensitivity to 
vagueness in the sphere but not in others,78 reflect the greater likeli-
hood of governmental abuse of its discretion79 and the abiding con-
cern for the harms of censorship. 
Third, the argument from governmental incompetence is unper-
suasive in the absence of a positive justification for free speech. If 
speech is not valued for advancing personal autonomy or truth, for 
example, why should we be concerned that the government is bi-
ased? It is simply not responsive to say that "[t]he issue is not 
whether totalitarian groups should be allowed to speak, but whether 
anyone should have the power to decide which groups are totalitar-
ian and which are not" (p. 62). He might equally say that the issue is 
not whether racism should be allowed, but whether anyone should 
have the power to decide what are unconstitutional racist practices. 
There are many responsibilities entrusted to governments that they 
do not discharge with great discernment. There is no particular rea-
son to remove governmental authority from the free speech picture 
unless the results of government's ineptitude cause special harms or 
preclude the achievement of some particularly valued benefits. If 
inefficiency and incompetence are the starting points, there might 
well be animated public discussion of whether sedition acts, environ-
mental protection regulations, or the postal service should be the first 
to be struck with the libertarian axe. 
VI 
In the end, Professor Schauer falls victim to a philosophical 
method that values analysis over synthesis. He razes the free speech 
structure, examines the bricks one at a time, discards most, and then 
has trouble rebuilding the edifice. A defense of a free speech princi-
ple, rooted in uncertainty and distrust of government, requires a ho-
listic approach if it is to stand. But perhaps I have unfairly accused 
Professor Schauer of not writing the book that I would have him 
write. His goal may have been only to illuminate the principles of 
free speech through "philosophical enquiry." That he chooses to 
probe the underpinnings of traditional free speech principles instead 
of synthesizing them into a more complex principle does not detract 
from the many virtues of his enterprise. The destruction of the ex-
isting edifice may be a necessary precursor to the erection of a new 
77. See P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 454-
69 (2d ed. 1983). 
78. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 730-38 (5th ed. 
1980). 
79. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraints, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 423-26 (1983). 
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one. The trouble with this view of Free Speech: A Philosophical En-
quiry is that Professor Schauer has greater ambitions for his work. 
The book does not end on page 86 with his discussion of "The Free 
Speech Principle"; rather he goes on to include sections on "Explica-
tion" and "Applications." The titles of these sections suggest that 
there is a principle to explicate and apply, that something has risen 
from the ashes of his philosophical enquiry. But this principle never 
clearly emerges except in relation to his negative arguments for free 
speech. On the other hand, the careful examination of hard cases in 
the second half of the book and the unwillingness to embrace a dog-
matic vision of free speech evidences an openness to integrative the-
ories. But, by and large, these integrative possibilities remain 
inchoate in the larger work. Schauer fails to acknowledge openly 
that a powerful justification for a free speech principle requires him 
to connect the arguments from uncertainty, government incompe-
tence, and democracy. Those arguments together operate to create a 
rationale that is stronger than any one argument standing alone. 
The critical insight is that freedom of expression is an epistemo-
logical process for determining what the majority wants. It is not 
only, or even primarily, rooted in the need to protect minorities from 
the overreaching of majorities in democratic polities. In the absence 
of verifiable criteria for determining majority sentiment, expression, 
like voting and lobbying, is an imperfect technique by which prefer-
ences are formed, articulated, and aggregated. It is both a method of 
directly influencing government and a means of bolstering other 
mechanisms of governmental accountability. In other words, free 
speech is not only an instrumental principle in relation to other dem-
ocratic constraints on government; it is itself a constraint. And these 
constraints are mutually affecting, with the entire panoply of con-
straints yielding a process that aspires to majority decision.making. 
"Majority rule" is indeed a "sterile" concept without such a 
qualification. 
Government officials, through communications efforts and other-
wise, have the self-interest and capacity to falsify consent, to manip-
ulate the same public opinion from which they gain their authority. 
And even where self-controlled citizens, speaking and acting autono-
mously in matters of governance, are not overwhelmed by govern-
ment communication, there will always be uncertainty as to whether 
the majority endorses a particular policy outcome.80 Many citizens 
do not participate in voting, lobbying, and similar activities;81 many 
are irrational and acquiescent (pp. 26-27); voters elect officeholders 
on the basis of many characteristics, not necessarily because their 
views overlap on all or most policy issues; legislative processes may 
80. The discussion in the text is largely taken from M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 152-57. 
81. See generally R. WOLFINGER & s. RosENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980). 
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thwart majority will; and the Arrow Theorem tells us that the order-
ing of the legislative agenda may determine policy outcomes. 82 
When some initiative is taken on behalf of the "majority," we can 
never be entirely sure that it is the majority and not just a self-inter-
ested government that is acting. Under such conditions of uncer-
tainty, freedom of expression is the means by which we verify and 
affirm majoritarian processes of governance. 83 
Schauer's conditions for an argument from democracy are so 
stringent as to preclude synthesis of free speech principles (pp. 40-
44). When he speaks of a "paradox of power,"84 he assumes that he 
can ascertain that a majority opposes free speech (p. 40). But how 
does he know this? All that he can say with certainty is that a gov-
ernment, purporting to represent the majority, has declined to pro-
tect speech. He assumes that democracy is dependent on "equal 
participation in government," "equal competence and universal ra-
tionality" (p. 41 ). Otherwise, the people are not "sovereign." But 
such strong forms of the argument doom it to empirical collapse. 
Obviously, people are not equal participants, they are not equally 
capable, and they certainly are not uniformly rational. But even im-
perfect citizens can affect their leaders. Charles Frankel comes much 
closer to the mark in his more modest aims for a democracy: 
"Government by consent" cannot be interpreted to mean that those 
who are governed necessarily agree with what their rulers decide to do. 
Nor can it mean that "the majority" agrees .... 
But to speak of majorities and minorities and the inevitability of 
disagreements is to suggest what "government by consent" expresses. 
It expresses the hope for a society in which ordinary people can influ-
ence the actions their leaders take. This means they can exercise some 
control over who their leaders will be. And it also means that they are 
required to obey only after having been actively consulted by those 
who issue the orders.85 
The point is that freedom of expression refers to the process by 
which the citizenry seeks to influence government. In the last analy-
sis, as I have previously written, "[m]ajority rule in a democratic 
society is not a simple substantive concept; it is a complex process of 
consultation in which citizens are free to make up their minds and 
express their opinions."86 Thus the principle of uncertainty com-
bines with the argument from democracy; for freedom of speech is 
82. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963); Levine & Plott, 
Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 (1977). 
83. M. YuooF, supra note 12, at ch. 10. 
84. See also Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 451-52 
(1983). 
85. C. FRANKEL, THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 34 (1962), quoted and discussed in M. 
YuooF, supra note 12, at 153-57. 
86. M. YuooF, supra note 12, at 153. 
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an indispensable means of verifying that the majority has the oppor-
tunity to influence policy. 
In fairness to Professor Schauer, he comes quite close to this con-
clusion without explicitly recognizing the synergistic relationship of 
uncertainty, governmental bias and incompetence, and democracy: 
As our leaders become elected rulers rather than servants, governmen-
tal superstructures are more likely to become as concerned with perpet-
uation of their own power as with acting in what they perceive to be 
the public interest . . . . [T]he same motivations that lead people to 
aspire to governmental office also lead those people to want to retain 
those positions. Freedom to criticize the government is a check on the 
survival instincts of self-perpetuating governmental organizations. [P. 
43]. 
Schauer thus builds on the impressive conceptual contributions of 
Professor Blasi.87 But he fails to note that the problem is not simply 
one of the ill-will of government officers; it is also a problem of the 
uncertainty that surrounds any substantive concept of majority will 
in a democracy. 
This refined version of the argument from democracy also in-
vokes the argument from autonomy. I take it that it is this interface 
of principles that Professor Scanlon once recognized in saying "a le-
gitimate government is one whose authority citizens can recognize 
while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational 
agents."88 Citizens are not autonomous in the sense that they are 
free from all or most of the constraints of culture or government. 
Scanlon is not a proselyte of the minimal state or an apologist for 
libertarianism.89 Citizens should be autonomous in relation to gov-
erning processes: 
[T]he argument for the Millian Principle rests on a limitation of the 
authority of states to command their subjects rather than on a right of 
individuals . . . . There are surely cases in which individuals have the 
right not to have their acts of expression interfered with by other indi-
viduals, but these rights presumably flow from a general right to be 
free from arbitrary interference . . . .90 
So too, equality need not be invoked in the _broadest sense of 
persons being equal in their intellects, tastes, resources, achieve-
ments, and income. In the speech context, equality of treatment in 
the public sphere may suffice. As Michael Walzer has stressed: 
Politics is always the most direct path to dominance, and political 
power ... is probably the most important, and certainly the most dan-
gerous, good in human history . . . . 
87. Blasi, supra note 66. 
88. Scanlon, supra note 61, at 214. I use the past tense in the text deliberately. See Scan-
lon, supra note 11. 
89. See Scanlon, supra note 1 I. 
90. See Scanlon, supra note 61, at 221. 
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One way of limiting political power is to distribute it widely. This 
may not work, given the well-canvassed dangers of majority tyranny; 
but these dangers are probably less acute than they are often made out 
to be.91 
In the artificially constructed world of democratic politics, per-
sons are to be treated as equal, autonomous, and rational, whatever 
their actual characteristics. In this sense, their human worth is af-
firmed. Such treatment leads to the recognition of a free speech 
principle, a principle that verifies majority rule and protects the 
processes of citizen influence over government. It is adherence to 
democratic norms that de.fines the treatment of citizens, not the char-
acteristics of actual citizens that suggest the democratic norms.92 
And adherence to those norms may affirm fundamental social and 
intellectual values, thereby contributing to the development of a 
"democratic personality" in citizens.93 
To a re.fined argument from democracy, Professor Schauer re-
sponds that the resultant principle of free speech is too narrow. He is 
unhappy because he "can make little sense of a notion of self-gov-
ernment in art, literature, or science" (p. 44). A satisfactory re-
sponse, though a "Philistine and anti-cultural" one in some 
quarters,94 might well be that if the most compelling justification for 
freedom of expression would not protect art, literature, and science, 
then they should not be protected. If Schauer's approach is self-con-
sciously conceptual and empirical, not intuitive, he is not compelled 
to reject narrow, defensible principles. Indeed, in other parts of the 
book, he does narrow the coverage. For example, his conclusion that 
hard-core pornography is not protected speech - pornography is ac-
tion because it provides sexual gratification akin to that associated 
with prostitution and "vibrating sex aid[s]" (p. 181)95 -would bene-
fit greatly from an infusion of the uncertainty, incompetence, and 
democracy arguments.96 The trouble is that, for all of Schauer's phi-
losophizing, there is no clear and sustained relationship between his 
articulation of principles in the first part of the book and his treat-
ment of specific applications in the last part. 
A holistic principle of free speech, which Schauer eschews, would 
recognize that the arguments from democracy, individual autonomy, 
91. M. WALZER, supra note 4, at 15 (footnote omitted). 
92. But see Scanlon, supra note 11. 
93. See Bollinger, supra note 84, at 458. 
94. Beth, The Public's Right to Know: The Supreme Court As Pandora? (Book Review) 81 
MICH. L. Rev. 880, 882 (1983); see also Scanlon, supra note 11; Chafee, Book Review, 62 
HARV. L. Rev. 891 (1949). 
95. I wonder if Professor Schauer would agree that governments ought to be able to ban 
Shakespearean comedies on the theory that a feather, used to tickle the viewer, might achieve 
the same response. 
96. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 542-50. 
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uncertainty, and governmental bias and incompetence are mutually 
relating and affecting.97 For example, in some instances we may not 
view government decisionmaking as likely to be influenced by the 
self-interest of government officials. This strikes me as particularly 
important if we are discussing judgment distorting speech (pp. 30, 
102), speech that "by-pass[es] our ability to consider ... reasons."98 
If some forms of speech - for example, perjury, incitement, and 
fraud - are likely to preclude deliberation by the listener and to 
inflict great injury, that type of speech may be a good candidate for 
regulation.99 And in many circumstances, particularly with regard 
to commercial speech, we may have less reason to believe that the 
government will act in a self-interested and biased manner. Most 
commercial speech is not a threat to those in power. The govern-
ment is not so much worried that the speaker's views will gain adher-
ents, as it is that the decisionmaking processes of listeners will be 
distorted. 100 
In other words, the application of the justification from bias and 
incompetence often may lead in different directions in commercial 
and political speech cases. This may partially explain the Supreme 
Court's recent rejection of the "clear and present danger'' test in 
political advocacy cases, 101 and its strong support for the regulation 
of false and misleading advertising in the commercial context. 102 As 
Professor Scanlon has stated, ''where political issues are involved 
governments are notoriouosly partisan and unreliable."103 But 
Scanlon is wrong to suggest that the government bias argument sup-
ports his treatment of commercial and political speech as distinct 
97. The phrase "mutually affecting" and, to some extent, my method of analysis are drawn 
from P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (reviewed in this issue); see also Bobbitt, A 
Reply to Professor JJall, 59 TEXAS L. REv. 829, 830 (1981). 
98. Scanlon, supra note 11, at 525. 
99. Professor Scanlon puts the matter this way: 
What I conclude from this is that the distinction between expression and other forms of 
actions is less important than the distinction between expression which moves others to 
act by pointing out what they take to be good reasons for action and expression which 
gives rise to action by others in other ways, e.g., by providing them with the means to do 
what they wanted to do anyway. 
• . . A person who acts on reasons he has acquired from another's act of expression acts 
on what he has come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient basis for action. The 
contribution to the genesis of his action made by the act of expression is, so to speak, 
superseded by the agent's own judgment . . . . 
Scanlon, supra note 61 at 212. 
100. See id at 209. 
101. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969). See generally Linde, "Clear and Present .Danger" Reexamined: .Dissonance in the Bran-
denburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970). 
102. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 775-81 
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
I 03. Scanlon, supra note 11, at 534. Ironically, Scanlon does not assimilate such speech to 
his judgment-distortion justification for censorship. Id at 525. 
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categories.104 Consider, for example, the differences in the judicial 
attitude toward different types of commercial speech. Judges may 
trust more the competence of government officials when they seek to 
protect listeners against judgment distorting commercial speech, for 
example fraudulent representations, than when they seek to regulate 
commercial speech bearing on a controversial public policy issue (for 
example, energy consumption).105 Perhaps cases involving commer-
cial speech advocating a harmful activity are more difficult, e.g., cig-
arette smoking and alcohol consumption. But unlike Professor 
Scanlon, who is troubled by a free speech principle that prevents 
'justified paternalism,"106 I see political advocacy of totalitarianism 
and commercial advocacy of harmful substances as indistinguishable 
in terms of 'justified paternalism." His categories of speech are en-
tirely unhelpful. If there is a principled distinction, it lies in the po-
tential for government bias, and this depends on the particular 
matters addressed by the speech. 
But there should be no mistake about the fact that a holistic ap-
proach would raise many issues that,. heretofore, have been largely 
ignored. Traditional categorizations of expression would need to be 
reexamined. For example, collective bargaining inevitably invokes 
the self-governing value of free speech. Yet there are many instances 
of the regulation of speech in this context. Secondary boycotts and 
picketing may be prohibited. The classification of topics as 
mandatory, permissive, or illegal subjects of collective bargaining 
may penalize participants for their expression. The employer's 
threats to close the plant or to fire employees, if they vote to be rep-
resented by a union, may be unfair labor practices.107 Since collec-
tive bargaining is a governance mechanism, free speech theorists 
should reflect upon the legitimacy of such regulatory practices in the 
labor law field. 
VII 
The Bible reminds us that "of making many books there is no 
end, and much study is a weariness of the fiesh." 108 If so, Professor 
Schauer should be happily weary, for his book reflects enormous ef-
fort and dedication to scholarship. But he is more interested in criti-
cizing concepts than he is in espousing them or in applying them to 
104. Id. at 537-42. 
105. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Commn. of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
106. Scanlon, supra note 11, at 532. See generally Stone, Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). 
107. See Swift, NLRB Overkill· Predictions of Plant Relocation and Closure and Employer 
Free Speech, 8 GA. L. REv. 77 (1973). 
108. Ecclesiastes 12:12. 
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concrete speech problems. The last half of his book, which provides 
a careful and balanced perspective on current free speech issues, is 
almost entirely disconnected from the first half. As he discusses such 
issues as the scope of free speech, rights of access to the mass media, 
pornography, prior restraints, and the like, there are few references 
to the philosophical arguments from uncertainty, democracy, and 
governmental incompetence. He is no longer the perfectionist, and 
at one point, he confesses that he is engaged in "intelligent balanc-
ing" (p. 144). Once again, two Frederick Schauers emerge. The first 
is deeply troubled by the conceptional moorings of free speech; he is 
a skeptic who is not quite sure that a defensible free speech principle 
exists. The second Frederick Schauer is a lawyer who accepts, on 
balance, the need to protect broadly freedom of expression. The first 
Schauer is the more interesting and provocative; the second comes 
closer to a defensible free speech principle. 
But whatever his shortcomings, Professor Schauer has made an 
enormous contribution to our understanding of the concepts that un-
derlie freedom of expression. As George Orwell once said of 
Charles Dickens, he "is one of those writers who are well worth 
stealing."109 For years to come, legal scholars, students, and judges 
will be borrowing from Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. Few 
will agree with all of Professor Schauer's conclusions, for he at-
tempts to map a terrain too treacherous for all but the most coura-
geous. Although he refuses to obfuscate his vision with the rose-
colored glasses of the true-believers110 or with the ideological blind-
ers of libertarians and critical legal theorists, partisans of all persua-
sions will be enriched by his efforts. 
109. G. Orwell, Charles Dickens, in A COLLECTION OF EsSAYS BY GEORGE ORWELL 48 
(1954). 
110. "The Devil is not the Prince of Matter; the Devil is the arrogance of the spirit, faith 
without smile, truth that is never seized by doubt." u. Eco, THE NAME OF THE ROSE 477 
(1983). 
